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CASE NOTE

MEDIMMUNE, MICROSOFT, AND KSR:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
IN 2007 TIPS THE BALANCE IN FAVOR OF
INNOVATION IN PATENT CASES, AND
THRICE REVERSES THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
SUE ANN MOTA *
INTRODUCTION
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
1
Discoveries.” Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted the first patent
2
act in 1790. The Patent Act of 1952 now allows an inventor to obtain a
patent for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
3
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”
A U.S. patent grants the inventor the exclusive right to make, use, or
4
sell the patented item, grants remedies for infringement including an
5
6
7
injunction, damages which may be trebled, and attorneys’ fees. Thus,
* Professor of Legal Studies, Associate Dean for Executive and MBA Programs, Bowling
Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A.
and B.A., Bowling Green State University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). The Act allowed one who invented or
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
thereof, to petition to have letters patent issued. See id.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
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a patent grants a valuable property right to the inventor, because during
the patent term of twenty years from the filing date of the patent
8
9
application, no one else may make, use or sell the patented invention.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive
10
In the last few terms, the U.S.
jurisdiction over patent appeals.
Supreme Court has heard several patent-related cases, yet has not
affirmed any of these. In 2005, for example, the Supreme Court
11
unanimously held in Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd., that
12
under a Patent Act exemption from infringement, the use of patented
compounds in preclinical studies is protected in certain situations,
13
vacating the judgment of the Federal Circuit.
In 2006, the Supreme Court held unanimously in eBay Inc. v. Merc
14
Exchange, LLC that the traditional four-factor test used by courts of
equity when awarding injunctive relief also applies to disputes under the
Patent Act, vacating and remanding the decision of the Court of
15
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Also in 2006, in a case that started as
16
a patent case, the Supreme Court again unanimously held in Illinois
Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. that in a patent tying case the
17
patent does not necessarily confer market power on the patentee.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision was concerning antitrust law,
the Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the U.S. Court of
18
Also in 2006, the Supreme Court
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
dismissed a patent case, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
19
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (a)(4) (2006).
11. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifescience I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005). See generally,
Sue Mota, Merck v. Integra Life Sciences-The Supreme Court Protects the Use of Patented
Compounds in Free Clinical Studies, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 54 (2006).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
13. Merck, 545 U.S. at 208.
14. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006). See generally, Sue
Mota, eBay v. MercExchange–Traditional Four-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to
Patent Cases According to the Supreme Court, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529 (2007).
15. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
16. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
17. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006). See generally, Sue
Ann Mota, The Untwining of Patent Law and Antitrust: No Presumption of Market Power in
Patent Tying Cases According to the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent
Ink, L 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 57, 58 (2006).
18. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45-46.
19. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006). See
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The Court in its 2006 term decided three patent cases and reversed
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in each. This article will
examine these three patent cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
2007. First, the Court in January 2007 in MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc. decided a patent licensee does not have to breach a
license agreement before seeking declaratory judgment that the
20
underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.
The
21
Federal Circuit’s judgment was reversed.
On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court decided both Microsoft Corp.
22
23
v. AT&T Corp. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. In the
former, Microsoft was held not to have supplied a component of an
invention from the United States that had the possibility of infringing
24
under the Patent Act. In the latter, which “could be one of the most
25
significant business cases of the last decade,” the Court unanimously
held that the Federal Circuit improperly applied a narrow and rigid
approach to the requirement of non-obviousness under the Patent Act,
26
and an expansive and flexible test must be used.
This Article will examine these three patent cases from the Court
and their implications. These three decisions will shape the face of
patent law for years to come. The balance has been tipped by the Court
away from the pro-patent perspective of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, and towards a pro-innovation approach which is
necessary in the fast-paced, high-technology global business
environment.
I. MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH
Genentech is the assignee and owner, with the City of Hope, of U.S.
Patent number 4,816,567, the Cabilly I patent, named after its first
inventor Shmuel Cabilly. This application was filed in April 1983 and
the patent was granted in March 1989 for an invention relating to the

generally, Sue Ann Mota, What is Patentable Subject Matter? The Supreme Court Dismissed
Lab Corp. v. Metabolite Laboratories, but the Issue is not Going Away, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 181 (2007).
20. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007). See infra Part I.
21. MedImmune, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 777.
22. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007). See infra Part II.
23. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). See infra Part III.
24. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759-60.
25. Michael Oreg, A Higher Hurdle for Investors: Has it Become Too Easy to Win and
Defend Patents? The Supreme Court Says Yes, BUSINESS WEEK, May 14, 2007, at 38.
26. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
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field of immunoglobulin production, and to using recombinant
techniques to produce immunoglobulins which are analogous to those
27
found in vertebrate systems. Genentech also is the assignee of U.S.
Patent number 6,331,415, the Cobilly II patent, filed in June 1988 and
granted in December 2001, for a continuation of the Cobilly I patent for
an invention relating to processes for producing immunoglobulins which
28
can use one or more vectors.
MedImmune had a license agreement since 1997 with Genentech
29
under the Cabilly I patent. After the Cabilly II patent was issued in
2001, Genentech advised MedImmune that one of its products,
30
Synagis®, was covered by the Cabilly II patent and MedImmune owed
royalties. In response, MedImmune filed suit for declaratory judgment
31
against Genentech.
MedImmune’s claims of determination of
27. Recombinant Immunoglobin Preparations, U.S. Patent No. 4,816,567 (filed April 8,
1983) (issued March 28, 1989).
28. Methods of Producing Immunoglobin Vectors and Transformed Host Cells, U.S.
Patent No. 6,331,415 (filed June 10, 1988) (issued Dec. 18, 2001). Celltech is the assignee and
owner of U.S. Patent number 4,816,397 [hereinafter Boss Patent] for multi chain peptides or
proteins and processes for their production. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F. 3d
958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Multichain Polypeptides or Proteins and Processes for their
Production, U.S. Patent No. 4,816,397 (filed Nov. 14, 1984) (issued March 28, 1989). In a U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) interference hearing which took seven and a half years,
the PTO gave the Boss Patent priority. MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 961. Genentech filed suit,
and a district court urged Genentech and Celltech to go to mediation. Id. The parties settled
and agreed that the Genentech patent had priority and entered into cross-licensing
agreements. Id. The district court directed the PTO to issue the Cabilly II patent.
Genentech, Inc. v. Celltech Therapeutics, Ltd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3489, No. 98-3926
MMCCWDB, at *8 (N.D. Cal. March 16, 2001).
29. MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 962. MedImmune also was licensed with Celltech for the
Boss Patent since 1998. Id.
30. Synagis® is indicated for the prevention of serious lower respiratory tract disease
caused by a respiratory synytial virus in pediatric patients, such as premature babies and
other children with medical conditions, at high risk.
RSV Prevention,
http://www.synagis.com/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). Over half a million babies have used
Synagis since 1998.
Id.
Injectable Synagis® is MedImmune’s “flagship product.”
MedImmune, Inc., HOOVER’S COMPANY RECORDS, In-depth Record, Hoover ID 10176
(Jan. 9, 2007).
Synagis® is classified as a humanized monoclonal antibody, or an animal
antibody modified into a predominantly human one. Brief of Petitioner, MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., No. 05-608, 2006 C.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 423 at *3 (May 15, 2006).
Synagis® was the first monoclonal antibody successfully developed to combat an infectious
disease. Id. For more on Genentech and its patents, see generally, David M. Dudzinski,
Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing Approval
Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal
Antibodies, 60 FOOD DRUG L. J. 143, 161-67 (2005).
31. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., No. CV03-2567 MRP, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23443, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 3003). The district court dismissed MedImmune’s antitrust
and unfair competition claim on summary judgment. Id. at *35-36.
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contractual obligations, patent unenforceability, patent invalidity, and
non-infringement of the patent were allowed to go forth against
Genentech, and the patent claims could go forward against City of
32
Hope.
Genentech sought dismissal of all of these claims based on lack of
33
subject matter jurisdiction. The district court cited Article III of the
Constitution, which authorizes the federal judiciary to hear cases and
34
The Declaratory Judgment Act requires an actual
controversies.
35
controversy between the parties.
Federal Circuit precedent was
deemed by the district court to be controlling, and dictated that the case
36
because
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
MedImmune was a licensee in good standing.
MedImmune appealed, arguing that it met the requirements of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, because if it stopped paying royalties, it
37
could be sued. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit held that the district
38
court did not err. The dissent would have found no jurisdiction and
would have transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
39
Circuit.
32. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV03-02567 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28678, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2004). Celltech was no longer a party. Id. The City
of Hope is a California-based non-profit with a National Cancer Institute-designated
Comprehensive Career Center. City of Hope and Genentech work collaboratively on
projects which have resulted in life-saving antibodies. Initial Brief for Appellee-Respondent,
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 05-608, 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 483, at *12
(July 26, 2006).
33. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., CV03-2567 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28680, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 26, 2004).
34. Id. at *2 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006), which states in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Id.
36. MedImmune, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28680, at *9, *13. The Federal Circuit had
previously determined that “controversies over patent validity enforcement, and
infringement would not be recognized while license agreements protected the licensee from
suit.” Id. at *5.
37. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
MedImmune also argued that the settlement between Genentech was collusive and
fraudulent. Id. at 965.
38. Id. at 969.
39. Id. at 971 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit should determine whether
the summary judgment was proper with the antitrust and unfair competition claims, according
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari
to decide whether Article III’s limitation on federal court jurisdiction to
41
cases and controversies, as reflected in the Declaratory Judgment
42
Act, requires a patent licensee to terminate or breach the license
agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent is
43
invalid, unforeseeable, or not infringed.
Justice Scalia, in January 2007, writing for the majority, first
observed that there was both a claim of patent invalidity and a contract
44
claim.
Turning to the jurisdiction issue, the majority stated that the “case of
actual controversy” language under the Declaratory Judgment Act
45
refers to cases or controversies under Article III of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court observed that there would be an actual controversy
if the licensee ceased to make required royalty payments, but if the
royalty payments were continued, as in this case, would there be a case
46
or controversy?
According to Supreme Court precedent, if the government, instead
of a private party, threatened action, then a plaintiff would not have to
expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the
47
governmental threat. Concerning action by a private party, the Court
examined the only Supreme Court precedent on point, Altvater v.
48
Freeman, which held that a licensee’s failure to stop paying royalties
to the dissent. Id. For more on the Federal Circuit’s decision, see, Laurence P. Colton and
Nigamnarayan Acharya, Intellectual Property, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1135, 1141-42 (2006);
Charles C. Gholz, A Critique of Decent Opinions in Patent Interferences, 88 J. PAT &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 305, 338-39 (2006).
40. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 546 U.S. 1169, 1169 (2006). See Kali N.
Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 79 (2006).
41. U.S. CONST. art. III.
42. See supra note 35.
43. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 767 (2007).
44. Id. at 768-69. The licensing agreement called for royalties whether or not the
patent is valid. Id. at 769.
45. Id. at 771.
46. Id. at 771-72.
47. Id. at 772-73 (citing Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)). A farmer
challenged the Washington State Alien Land Law, which was held not to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 772. Justice Scalia observed that the
plaintiff did not have to “bet the farm” to bring action. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772.
48. Alvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943). The issue of patent validity could be
raised in a counterclaim in a suit for infringement involving a patent for a cutout machine for
shoe uppers. Id. at 360-63. The Court stated that “[a] controversy was raging,” and the fact
that royalties were paid did not make this a dispute of a hypothetical or abstract nature. Id.
at 364.
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did not preclude a finding of a case or controversy if the payments were
involuntary or coercive. The respondent Genentech argued the
common law rule that a party to a contract cannot both “challenge its
49
validity and continue to reap its benefits.” The Court stated, however,
that “it is hard to see how the common law rule has any application
50
According to the Supreme Court, if the respondents were
here.”
correct that either the licensing agreement or the common law
precluded suit, then the respondents would win on the merits, not that
51
jurisdiction is defeated. The merits were left to the lower court on
52
remand. Thus, a petitioner is not required to breach a license to seek
declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid, unforeseeable, or non53
infringed. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was reversed and the
54
case was remanded.
The lone dissenter, Justice Thomas, believed that the case in
question was not a case or controversy within Article III of the
55
Constitution. MedImmune was a licensee in good standing, and thus it
56
removed any threat of suit.
MedImmune now allows a licensee in good standing to challenge the
57
validity of the licensed patent. This tips the balance away from socalled patent trolls, who purchase patents solely to enforce them against
others, and allows a licensee to challenge the patent’s validity while
ethically not breaching the license agreement, which is, at least
58
occasionally, forced on the licensee. The merits of the agreement will
be reached on remand.

49. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 776. MedImmune pointed out that the license contains
no promise by MedImmune not to sue. Id. Further, Genentech disclaims any warranty of
patent validity. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc.,
No. 05-608, 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 739, at *24 (Aug. 30, 2006).
50. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777.
51. Id. at 776. Respondents also urged dismissal on a discretionary basis, that the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006), allows a court to declare rights. Id. at
776. The Court observed, though, that a court is not required to do so. Id. The discretionary
dismissal is for the lower court on remand. Id. at 777.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 780. Justice Thomas also dissented on the issue of the contract claim,
asserting that MedImmune did not raise and preserve one. Id. at 779. Further, according to
Justice Thomas, Altvater was inapplicable. Id. at 781.
57. Id. at 777.
58. One week after this decision, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari and also vacated and remanded MedImmune. MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc.,
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II. MICROSOFT V. AT&T
In a big win for Microsoft, the Supreme Court held on April 30,
2007, in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., that Microsoft was not liable
for infringing AT&T’s patent because Microsoft does not supply
components of foreign-made competitors when it exports copies of
Windows on master disks and encrypted software from the United
59
States to be installed on foreign computers. This decision, along with
its ramifications for the software industry, will be discussed in this
section.
AT&T owns patent number 32,580 (the ‘580 patent) relating to
speech processing, and more particularly to digital speech coding
60
arrangements. In June 2001, AT&T filed suit, alleging that Microsoft
directly, contributorily, and willfully both infringed and induced others
to infringe claims of this patent, by working, using, offering to sell, or
61
selling certain Microsoft products. Microsoft ships “golden master”
disks with the Windows Operating System on them to foreign original
equipment manufactures (OEMs), and pursuant to a license, the OEMs
from the master disk installs the operating system onto foreignassembled computers. Similarly, Microsoft supplies the Windows
Operating System code to foreign OEMs by sending an encrypted
127 S. Ct. 1118 (2007). The Federal Circuit in Centocor had similarly ruled that there was no
case or controversy when the licensee of a patent was in compliance with the license
agreement. See generally, Sasha Mayergoyz et al., 2005 Patent Laws of the Federal Circuit, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 1001, 1012-14 (2006).
59. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1751 (2007). Microsoft is the
world’s number one software manufacturer, and ranks forty-ninth on the Fortune 500
ranking. Microsoft Corp., Hoovers Company Records, In-Depth Records, Hoover ID 14120
(May 1, 2007). AT&T ranks twenty-seventh on the Fortune 500. AT&T Inc., Hoovers
Company Records, In-Depth Records, Hoover ID 11379 (May 1, 2007).
60. Initial Brief-Appellee AT&T, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2007
U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 57, at *19 (Jan. 23, 2007). The invention claimed in the ’580 patent
was for digital speech compression, which transmits speech by converting it into digital code
and decodes it at its destination. This technology is recognized as a landmark. The patent
expired in 2001. Id.
61. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01- Cir. 4872 (WHP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10716, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2003). The district court granted Microsoft’s motion for
partial summary judgment, limiting AT&T’s damages to those occurring on or after April 2,
1999, when AT&T sent a letter to Microsoft to satisfy the actual notice requirement of the
Patent Act. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d 409, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
AT&T’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted on Microsoft’s affirmative
defenses of implied license and equitable estoppel. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01 Liu.
4872, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1214, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004). AT&T’s motion for partial
summary judgment on Microsoft’s affirmative defense and counter claim of inequitable
conduct was also granted. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1648, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).
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electronic transmission of object code, which is decrypted and installed
by the foreign OEMs. According to AT&T, the golden master disks
and the encrypted electronic transmissions infringe claims of AT&T’s
62
‘580 patent.
Microsoft moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that what
63
it does is not an infringement. The Patent Act states that supplying
from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of
a potential invention, where such components are uncombined in whole
or in part to actively induce the combination of the components outside
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent, constitutes
64
Microsoft thus moved, unsuccessfully, for summary
infringement.
judgment, contending both that the object code and software are not
components, but rather intangible information, and that the copies are
65
not supplied from the United States.
Microsoft appealed, and in July 2005, the Court of Appeals for the
66
Federal Circuit affirmed. The appeals court deemed the software to
67
both be a component of a patented invention, and to be supplied from
68
Judge Rader dissented on the extraterritorial
the United States.
69
expansion of United States patent law. The dissenter found nothing in
the statute to attach liability for manufacturing activities occurring
62. See supra note 60.
63. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3340, at *4
(March 5, 2004).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006) states:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention,
where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to
actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in
a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the
United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
Id.
65. Microsoft, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3340, at *6.
66. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at 1369.
68. Id. at 1370. This was a question of first impression for the appeals court. Id. at
1369.
69. Id. at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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entirely abroad. According to the dissent, AT&T can protect itself by
71
obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.
Microsoft appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of
72
certiorari. The Court was asked to decide whether the software code
73
was a patented invention under the Patent Act, and if so, is the
transmission of that object code from the United States to a location
74
outside the country a supply of the component? At oral argument,
counsel for Microsoft argued that the master disk was not a component,
and the information on the master disk was useless to the computer
75
until it was made into a physical object which the computer could read.
Counsel for AT&T contended that the provision of the Patent Act was
76
violated when the object code was supplied from the United States.
The Supreme Court agreed with Microsoft that the export of master
77
disks and encrypted software does not infringe AT&T’s U.S. patent.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court and joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter, stated that there is no infringement when a
78
patented product is made and sold in another country, but there is an
exception providing for infringement when one supplies from the
United States a patented invention’s components for combination
79
abroad. Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that there are arguments on
both sides of the issue of extending the Patent Act exception to the
80
allegedly infringing conduct in this case. The Court discussed Deep
South Packing Co. v. Laitrom Corp., which held that it was “not an

70. Id. at 1375.
71. Id. at 1376. See generally, Christopher Rogers, Case Note, AT&T v. Microsoft: Is
This a Case of Deep South Déjà Vu? 59 ME. L. REV. 191 (2007); Nicholaus F. Rericha, Case
Note, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.: Closing the Deep South Loophole (For Good This
Time), 31 DAYTON L. REV. 551 (2006).
72. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467, 467 (2006).
73. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1753 (2007).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006).
75. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2007 U.S. Trans LEXIS 13, at *6,
(Feb. 21, 2007). The patent covers a program which has to be “married” to a computer. Id.
at *11. The United States as amicus curiae agreed, stating that the copy or the hard drive is
the component. Id. at *19.
76. Id. at *39. Counsel acknowledged that the statute does not reach overseas
activities. Id. at *43. Further, counsel could not think of any other machine than a computer
that has a component that is not a physical thing. Id. at *47.
77. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759-60. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was reversed. Id.
78. Id. at 1781.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006).
80. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1751.
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infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United
81
After Deep South, Congress enacted the provision of the
States.”
82
Patent Act which is in dispute in the instant case.
First addressing the question of software as a “component,” the
Court had to decide at what stage in a transaction software becomes a
83
component. Because Congress included only combinable components
84
in the patent statute, but not also “information,” “instructions,” or
“tools” from which the components could be generated, the Court
85
concluded that only a copy of Windows is a component.
Concerning the second question of whether Microsoft supplied
components from the United States, the Court concluded that a
86
conventional reading of the statute requires a negative answer. The
87
Court agreed with the dissent in the Federal Circuit, that “supplying”
means a separate activity from a later copying or reproducing in a
88
foreign locale.
AT&T contends that this ruling leaves a loophole for software
manufactures, who may quickly and cheaply send the master disk or
code from the United States, instead of making installation copies in the
89
United States. The Court stated that it is up to Congress to close the
81. Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972). Deep South’s
foreign purchases did not infringe as they assembled and used machines allegedly infringing
on Laitrom’s patent claims outside the United States. Id. at 526-27.
82. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006); Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1752.
83. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1756. “Component” is commonly defined as a “constituent
part,” “element,” or “ingredient.” Id. at 1755 n.11.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006).
85. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1756. The Court did not decide whether software in the
abstract or the intangibles could ever qualify as a component. Id. at 1756 n.13.
86. Id. at 1756.
87. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. Microsoft issued a press release
following the decision which stated in pertinent part:
Today’s Supreme Court decision is important for the entire information technology
industry, adding clarity and balance to our patent system. This decision promotes a
global patent system that works. The ruling ensures that U.S. courts, like courts
elsewhere, can respect the patent laws of other countries, helping promote
cooperation among patent systems worldwide.
Microsoft statement on U.S. Supreme Court decision in AT&T case, http://www.micro
soft.com/Presspass/press/2007/apr07/04-30ATTPR.mspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
88. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1756-57. The Court did not address Microsoft’s contention
that a disk sent from the United States used to install software on a foreign computer would
not give rise to liability for infringement if the disk were removed after infringement. Id. at
1757 n.14. Justice Ginsburg did not reach this issue, id., but Justice Alito’s concurrence did
not include note 14, id. at 1760 (Alito, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1759. Microsoft argued that a contrary ruling, however, would either put
software companies on a different playing field than other industries, or expand the

100 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 12:1
90

loophole if Congress deems such action appropriate. The statutory
exception does not apply to design tools such as blueprints, schematics,
templates, and prototypes, as the Court would not put the master disks
and encrypted software which Microsoft exported into a separate
91
category.
92
Justice Alito concurred, joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer.
The concurrence reached the same conclusion, but by different
93
reasoning. Agreeing that a “component” must be something physical,
the concurrence reasoned that since no physical object supplied from
the United States was combined with foreign computers, there is no
94
infringement.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the holding of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is closer to the intent of Congress in
95
enacting the provision in question. According to the dissent, software
96
is a component. Thus, concerning patents on computer software, it is
more important than ever that patent holders obtain and enforce
foreign patents. “Foreign law alone, not United States law, currently
governs the manufacture and sale of components of patented inventions
97
in foreign countries.”
III. KSR V. TELEFLEX
In a decision issued by the Supreme Court on the same day as
98
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Court issued a unanimous
landmark decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. and
broadened the obviousness inquiry beyond what the Court of Appeals
99
for the Federal Circuit had been applying. Where Microsoft dealt with
jurisdiction of U.S. Patent Law. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT
& T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2007, U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 95, at *25 (Feb. 14, 2007).
90. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759. Congress realizes how easily software and other
media can be transmitted and copied. Id. at 1760.
91. Id. at 1759.
92. Id. at 1760 (Alito, J., concurring). As with Justice Ginsburg, the concurrence
excluded footnote 14. See supra note 88. Chief Justice Roberts took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
93. Id. at 1760.
94. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1761. Since the code on the master disk supplied from the
U.S. is not a component, then not even a copy of the master disk is a component. Id. at 1762.
95. Id. at 1762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1763 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1749.
98. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
99. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007).
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100

newer technology of computer software and its export,
KSR deals
with the manufacturing technology of an automobile’s automatic gas
101
However KSR’s ruling on the patent requirement of
pedal.
102
nonobviousness has implications for many industries in many sectors.
The Patent Act of 1952 added the statutory requirement of
103
nonobviousness, but this requirement for patentability goes back to
104
the Supreme Court decision of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850. The
Supreme Court articulated a test for determining nonobviousness in
105
106
1966 in Graham v. John Deere.
Forty-one years later, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided another landmark case on nonobviousness,
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., wherein the Court reversed the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and provided an expansive
flexible approach to obviousness, which promotes the progress of useful
107
arts.
108
Plaintiff Teleflex,
through its subsidiary, Technology Holding
100. See supra Part II.
101. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735-36.
102. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006), which states in part:
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title [35 U.S.C. § 102], if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.
Id.
104. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850).
105. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). First the court must determine
the scope and content of the prior art. Id. at 17-18. Then the court must determine the
differences between the prior art and the patent claim in question. Id. Then the court must
determine the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Id. Also, the court must evaluate
evidence of secondary considerations. Id. The same day, the Court also decided Calmar, Inc.
v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), and U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
106. The Supreme Court decided three patent cases involving nonobviousness in
between Graham and KSR. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S.
57 (1969); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273
(1976); S. Jafar Ali, You Suggest What? How KSR Returned Bite to Nonobviousness, 16 FED.
CIR. B. J. 247 at n.12 (2006-07).
107. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1727. This decision was proper, and should lead to an
improvement in patent examination quality, according to one author. Anard G. Patel, KSR
v. Teleflex and Motivation to Combine, 80 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 1077, 1084
(2006).
108. Teleflex Inc. is a publicly traded company that has many product lines and
operations which include the sale of marine, auto, and industrial products. In 2005, it sold its
automotive pedal systems to an affiliate of Sun Capitol Partners. Teleflex Inc., Hoover
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Corporation, holds patents used in the automotive industry, including
an adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.
Specifically, patent number 6,237,565 (the ’565 patent), called the
Engeleau patent after its inventor, relates to a vehicle control pedal
assembly having an adjustable mechanism which rotates and provides
109
input to the electronic throttle control.
Defendant KSR is a direct competitor of Teleflex, and also is a
manufacturer and supplier of auto parts, including adjustable pedal
110
systems.
KSR was selected by General Motors to supply adjustable
pedal assemblies for certain vehicles, and plaintiffs allege that these
111
pedal systems infringe a claim of the ’565 patent. The defendant KSR
answered, arguing both that there is no infringement and that the ’565
patent is invalid under the Patent Act because it would have been
obvious to someone with ordinary skill in the art of designing pedal
112
assemblies.
113
The district court applied the test of Graham v. John Deere for
114
obviousness, and granted summary judgment for KSR.
The district
court concluded that a hypothetical person with an undergraduate
degree in mechanical engineering or its equivalent in industry
experience, with familiarity with pedal control systems, would have
found the improvement in the only claim of the ‘565 patent at issue

Company Records, In-Depth Records, Hoover ID 12375 (May 1, 2007).
109. Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control, U.S. Patent No.
6,237,565 (filed Aug. 22, 2000) (issued May 29, 2001). Claim is for a vehicle control pedal
apparatus comprising:
a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle structure; an adjustable pedal
assembly having a pedal arm moveable in force and aft directions with respect to
said support; a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal assembly with
respect to said support and defining a pivot axis; and an electronic control attached
to said support for controlling a vehicle system; said apparatus characterized by said
electronic control being responsive to said pivot for providing a signal that
corresponds to pedal arm position as said pedal arm pivots about said pivot axis
between rest and applied positions wherein the position of said pivot remains
constant while said pedal arm moves in fore and aft directions with respect to said
pivot.
Id. at [5]–[6].
110. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
111. Id. at 584-85. Specifically, Teleflex claims that claim four is infringed. Id. at 584.
Two other patents were alleged to have their claims infringed, but the parties stipulated to
the dismissal of these claims. Id. at 585.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 587-96.
114. Id. at 596.
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115

obvious when compared to the prior art. Thus the district court found
the claim in question invalid for obviousness, agreeing with KSR.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that the district court did not apply the correct teaching116
suggestion-motivation test.
Instead, according to the appeals court,
the district court applied an incomplete teaching-suggestion-motivation
117
test, and the district court should have made specific findings showing
a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art teachings in
the particular manner claimed by the patent at issue.
KSR appealed, arguing that the teaching-suggestion-motivation test
applied by the Federal Circuit has no basis in either the text of the
118
Patent Act or in 150 years of precedent of the Supreme Court.
According to KSR, the teaching-suggestion-motivation test is actually
119
based on a rejection of the Supreme Court’s precedents.
Teleflex,
however, argued that the Court should not overturn the “flexible”
standard for obviousness used by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit for four decades, the settled suggestion-teaching-motivation
120
inquiries.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the
121
Federal Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court began by
rejecting the rigid approach used by the appeals court in applying the
122
teaching-suggestion-motivation test.
Instead, Supreme Court
precedent including Hotchkiss v. Greenwood and Graham v. John Deere
123
reflect a “functional” yet “broad” approach.
Further, a patent for a
combination which only unites old elements according to known
124
methods is likely to be obvious.
“[A] Court must ask whether the
115. Id.
116. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
117. Id. at 290. See generally, James Skelly, Legal Update, Teaching-SuggestionMotivation Under Review: Developments in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 13 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 107 (2007); Michael Astorino, Obviously Troublesome: How High Should
the Standard be for Obtaining a Patent, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 239 (2007).
118. Initial Brief of Appellant KSR, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., No. 04-1350, 2006
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 702, at *24.
119. Id. at *54.
120. Id. at *9.
121. KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007).
122. Id. at 1735.
123. Id. at 1739.
124. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
This case predates the 1952 Patent Act and Graham v. John Deere, but the concept remains
valid. The cases decided with and after Graham also reflect this principle. See KSR, 127 S.
Ct. at 1731 (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966); Anderson’s-Black Rock,
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improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements
125
according to their established functions.”
The Court acknowledged that following the principles for
determining obviousness may be more difficult in other cases than in
126
KSR. It is relatively easy to determine obviousness when one known
element is substituted for another, or a known technique is applied to
the prior art. In other cases involving interrelated teaching of multiple
patents, however, the effects of demands known to the designers or
present in the marketplace, and the background possessed by a person
127
ordinarily skilled in the art may have to be ascertained.
The helpful
insight of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test should not have
128
become a rigid mandatory formula.
The Court concluded that “[w]e build and create by bringing to the
tangible and palpable reality around us new works based on instinct,
simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes
even genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge,
129
define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more.”
Since KSR showed convincing evidence that the improvement to the gas
pedal design was obvious to one of ordinary skill in the prior art, the
130
appeals court was reversed and the case was remanded.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court decided three major patent cases
in 2007, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in each.
Independently, each case is important, and together, the Court has
changed the face of patent law. The first, MedImmune, Inc. v.
131
Genentech, Inc., reasonably allows a licensee in good standing to
challenge the validity of the underlying patent. In Microsoft Corp. v.
132
AT&T Corp., an important decision for the software industry, the
Court held that it is not an infringement to supply from the United
States a master disk or encrypted software, from which copies are made
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273
(1976)).
125. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1731.
126. Id.
127. Id. Courts should explicitly state this analysis. Id. at 1731-32.
128. Id. at 1731.
129. Id. at 1746.
130. Id.
131. See supra Part I.
132. See supra Part II.

2008]

TIPPING THE BALANCE IN FAVOR OF INNOVATION

105

overseas to be installed on foreign computers. Finally, and perhaps the
case with the broadest applications, the Court in KSR International Co.
133
v. Teleflex Inc., turned the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
from the rigid teaching-suggestion-motivation test to a more flexible test
in line with the Court’s precedent for obviousness. As a consequence of
these cases, licensees do not have to break the license to contest the
underlying patent. In turn, the power of so-called “patent trolls” has
been weakened, registering the patent in overseas patent offices
becomes much more important, and innovation is encouraged as
obvious improvements over the prior art will not be patentable.

133. See supra Part III.

